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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal Law-Discovery in Criminal Cases. In State v. Thomp-
son,' the Washington court allied itself with the liberal view on pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. For the first time, a defendant was
permitted pre-trial examination of material in the prosecutor's pos-
session.
Defendant was an eighteen-year-old Canadian accused of first degree
murder. Before trial, court-appointed counsel moved for the order of
disclosure, stating that "inspection of the documents was necessary
to the proper preparation for trial of the cause and essential to cross-
examination, and for possible impeachment purposes."2 Specifically,
the documents were: (1) statements made by defendant while under
arrest and without counsel, (2) autopsy reports on victim, and (3) FBI
reports on the examination of clothing, personal effects, and blood
samples of defendant and victim. The trial court granted discovery of
the requested documents, and the state sought a writ of prohibition.
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's order. In
affirming this order, the Washington court took a stride forward,
recognizing the need of a defendant in certain cases to have certain
information made available to him.
The Washington court did not change its rule by the Thompson
decision. Since 1895, the rule in Washington has been that discovery
in criminal cases is at the discretion of the trial court.3 What dis-
tinguishes Thompson is that it is the first case in which the Washington
Supreme Court has upheld a lower court's order permitting discovery
before the trial in a criminal case.
Why did the supreme court allow discovery in the Thompson case?
Unfortunately, the majority opinion did not present the conflicting
arguments traditionally surrounding the problem of criminal discovery,
nor did it explain its decision to accept a liberal rather than a strict
view. Rather, it accepted the reasons given by the trial court and con-
cluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting
discovery.'
In connection with the autopsy report, the court had to surmount
1 154 Wash. Dec. 91, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
2 Id. at 93, 319 P.2d at 320.
3 State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 Pac. 157 (1895). For other cases illustrating the
same rule, see State v. Payne, 25 Wn.2d 407, 171 P.2d 227 (1946) ; State v. Clark, 21
Wn.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944); State v. Morrison, 175 Wash. 656, 27 P.2d 1065
(1933).
4 Lower court held discovery was proper because defendant was a foreigner, only
eighteen years old, indigent, and represented by court-appointed counsel.
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an additional obstacle. By statute,5 autopsy reports in Washington
are "confidential." The court distinguished "confidential" from "privi-
leged" and thus made the autopsy report a subject for discovery. It
reached this result by also citing the statute which allows a person to
obtain the result of an autopsy.' Furthermore, the court distinguished
State v. Petersen,' which had apparently held that a defendant was not
entitled to pre-trial discovery of an autopsy report, by referring to the
statements therein concerning autopsy reports as dicta.
To delve into the principle involved, it is necessary to go outside
Washington and examine opinions of other courts. One of the earliest
informative opinions was that in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Court.' There, the New York Court of Appeals held that it was proper
for the intermediate court to have quashed the trial court's order grant-
ing discovery. The material sought for discovery was statements of
witnesses and of a conspirator, which could not be introduced in evi-
dence. Speaking for the court, Justice Cardozo said that the remedy
sought was beyond any precedent and could not be obtained in the
New York courts. He admitted that the requested statements probably
would have aided defendant in planning her defense.
New Jersey perhaps presents the best cases for an analysis of the
criminal discovery problem. In 1951, New Jersey seemingly adopted
the standard rule that discovery in criminal cases is at the discretion
of the trial court by upholding an order denying discovery.' Then
came State v. Tune.'0 The trial court there granted discovery of de-
fendant's confession and denied discovery of witnesses' statements.
The order granting discovery was reversed. The court refused to
accept defendant's allegation that he could not remember the contents
of the confession as a sufficient reason for granting discovery. The
Tune decision, which affirmed the refusal to grant discovery of the
witnesses' statements, in effect made discovery non-existent in New
Jersey. The dissenting opinion attacked the theory that advantages
are already with defendant, pointing out that the state has the whole
5 RCW 68.08.105. "Reports and records of autopsies or post mortems shall be confi-
dential, except to the prosecuting attorney or law enforcement agencies having juris-
diction. . .
6 RCW 68.08.102. "Any party by showing just cause may petition the court to have
an autopsy made and results thereof made known to said party at his own expense."
The court found that these two sections read together did not make autopsy reports
"privileged."
7 47 Wn2d 836, 289 P.2d 1013 (1955) (trial court abused its discretion in entering
order to abate proceedings until defendant given a copy of autopsy report).
8 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
9 State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A2d 568 (1951), aff'd, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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advantage when the defendant is subjected to intense police interroga-
tion, the state then being able to examine the confession to obtain
evidence while denying the same opportunity to the defendant.
In 1958 the New Jersey court allowed discovery of a confession."
Adopting the minority position of Tune, the court reasoned that often
in criminal trials, the confession is the core of the case. Its content is
important in establishing guilt. Certain facts may be omitted which
should have been included, or certain prejudicial matter may be con-
tained in it. At any rate, the defendant should have ample time, as
does the state, to compare other evidence with the statements in the
confession. The court specifically rejected the four reasons often given
for denial of discovery. As to perjury, the court said that there was
no proof that pre-trial discovery caused deliberate lies. As for in-
equality, while a defendant has many advantages in a trial, it is the
state, with its wealth and modern detecting devices, which has the
advantage in the matter of examining articles and documents. Further-
more, the court, in granting discovery, could protect against the
intimidation of witnesses. Finally, the rising incidence of crime is no
reason for denying an individual defendant all opportunities to clear
himself.
Few state court cases have been carried to the United States Supreme
Court. Those which have been reviewed by that tribunal give little
relief to a defendant denied discovery in a state court. In Leland v.
Oregon," it was held that denial of discovery did not violate the due
process clause. A similar result was reached in Cicenia v. LeGay."
The Supreme Court said that while it might be better practice to allow
discovery, failure to do so is not a denial of a fair trial.
In other jurisdictions, under the general rule that the trial court has
discretionary power to permit inspection of documents and articles in
the prosecutor's possession," specifically, the decisions run the gamut
from no right of discovery to a very liberal discovery procedure.
The federal courts are of course governed by the federal rules. Those
applicable are Rule 16 and Rule 17(c)." In Bowman Dairy Co. v.
10 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
11 State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
12 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
13 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
14 State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954) ; People
v. Murphy, 412 Ill. 458, 107 N.E.2d 748 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass.
205; 80 N.E.2d 825 (1948) ; People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W2d 739 (1959) ;
State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950) ; State v. Thompson, 154 Wash. Dec.
91, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
15Rule 16 enables a defendant to examine documents and other tangible objects
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United States, 6 in explaining the applicability of these rules, the Su-
preme Court revealed the tendency of allowing discovery in the federal
courts. The court stated: "However, the plain words of the Rule
[17(c)] are not to be ignored. They must be given their ordinary
meaning to carry out the purpose of establishing a more liberal policy
for the production, inspection and use of materials at the trial."' The
federal courts are evidently progressing toward a more liberal discovery
policy; they do, however, construe the rules literally. They have held
that defendants' confessions are not covered by Rule 16.18
Neighboring western states display the range from strict to liberal
discovery policies. Oregon still follows the stricter view. In its most
recent case, 9 the prosecution possessed defendant's confession and
coroner's records pertaining to the death of the victim. Prior to the
trial for murder, the trial court denied discovery, and the Oregon
Supreme Court upheld the denial, holding that it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny the motion. Mentioned as authority was State v.
Clark,0 a Washington case decided when Washington also maintained
a strict view on discovery. Both cases were heard on appeal, with error
assigned after conviction.
Idaho has few cases pertaining to this subject. Probably still good
law in Idaho is a 1929 decision in which the court held that discovery
applied only to civil cases.2 Two notes of caution should be mentioned
here: this is a rather old case and the discovery was sought from a
third party.
On the other hand, California has presented a line of cases liberally
granting discovery. Typical is Powell v. Superior Court,2 where the
California Supreme Court reversed a denial of discovery to a defendant
in an embezzlement case. Sought by the defendant were his signed
statement and a typewritten transcript of a tape recording given to
the police. The court held that while the trial judge has discretion to
order discovery in criminal cases, he will be abusing that discretion if
seized from him or from others. According to the Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 16, this was a departure from previous procedures in federal criminal cases. Rule
17(c) allows a defendant to obtain by subpoena evidentiary material which was not
seized or is not to be used as government evidence.
16341 U.S. 214 (1951).
17 Id. at 220.
is Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Shores v. United States,
174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949).
19 State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
20 21 Wn.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944).
2 1 Idaho Galena Mining Co. v. Judge of Dist. Court, 47 Ida. 195, 273 Pac. 952 (1929).
22 48 Cal.2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
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he refuses to order discovery when adequate reasons are stated. Illus-
trating its liberal viewpoint, the court said,
That it was desired that the state's evidence remain undisclosed, par-
takes of the nature of a game, rather than judicial procedure. The state
in its might and power ought to be and is too jealous of according a
defendant a fair and impartial trial to hinder him in intelligently pre-
paring his defense and in availing himself of all competent material and
relevant evidence that tends to throw light on the subject-matter on
trial.23
Other states present various degrees of liberality.24
In forecasting the effect of the Thompson decision in Washington,
it must be remembered that a defendant is not, by that case, entitled
as of right to discovery. The case has opened the door in Washington
for a trial court to order discovery. Already the case has made its
presence felt. In State v. Olsen,5 the court upheld a contempt order
against a coroner for refusing to turn over an autopsy report to a
defendant who was granted discovery by the trial court. The big test
of just how far Washington has gone will come when, under facts
similar to the Thompson case, the trial court denies discovery. Will
the supreme court overrule and call the denial an abuse of discretion,
or will it continue to follow the old cases where discovery was denied?
The answer will be a strong indication of Washington's place on the
scale of liberality in granting pre-trial discovery in criminal cases.
ROBERT G. SWENSON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Domestic Relations - Adoption - Necessity of Consent by Nat-
ural Parent - Constitutional Aspects. In the recent case of In re
Candell's Adoption' the Washington court held that a father's consent
23 312 P.2d at 701, quoting from State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132, 135(1927).
24 For example, Oklahoma follows a carefully limited discovery rule. "Only because
of the peculiar circumstances of this case are we impelled to deny the writ of prohibition
herein prayed for." State ex. rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610, 615 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1957) (order granting discovery upheld). Because a recording made to the county
attorney was not evidence nor applicable to the "essence of the case," discovery of it
was denied. Application of Killion, 338 P.2d 168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
Louisiana presents an unusual situation. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273
(1945), held that refusal to allow defendant to inspect his confession deprived him of a
fair and impartial trial, thereby making discovery of confessions a right in Louisiana.
Later cases strictly limit the Dorsey rule to confessions. State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337,
59 So. 2d 411 (1951), held that a defendant is not entitled to any witnesses' statements
or reports in police or district attorney's hands.
25 154 Wash. Dec. 275, 340 P.2d 171 (1959).
1 154 Wash. Dec. 279, 340 P.2d 173 (1959).
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